In this guide
Review administrator access by what a person can do, not only by the role label shown in a system. “Manager,” “HR” or “administrator” may contain different permissions in different products and configurations. The review needs the actual capabilities assigned to named authorized users.
This is an employer access-governance guide, not a login or recovery service. The Resourcing Edge homepage names PrismONE and older PrismHR routes, while OneDigital’s PEO page describes re360. Confirm the platform and role documentation assigned to your organization; no universal menu path is supplied here.
Separate five capabilities
| Capability | Question to answer | Evidence to retain |
|---|---|---|
| View | Which populations and data fields can this account read? | Scope from the current role/permission configuration |
| Change | Which records or payment-related settings can it modify? | Authorized business need and approved assignment |
| Approve | Which actions can it authorize or release? | Approval authority and any restrictions |
| Export | Can it download bulk or sensitive records? | Need for export and permitted handling process |
| Administer | Can it create users, change roles or reset access? | Privileged-access owner and monitoring arrangements |
Include service and integration accounts where they exist. Those accounts may not appear on an ordinary employee roster. Record the business owner, purpose, data scope and authorized maintenance process without copying credentials into the review file.
Test the permission, not the label
Use an approved test method with the system owner. A role-description document is useful, but a controlled test can establish whether the actual assignment permits the intended action and restricts an unauthorized one. Do not probe beyond your authorization or use a live payroll change as a casual test.
Where direct testing is not possible, document the evidence used and its limitation. A screenshot of a role name alone may not show population scope, export permission or inherited access. Ask the provider or administrator for the appropriate configuration evidence.
Consider combinations
An account that can enter a sensitive change and approve the resulting action may warrant additional review. So may an account that can export all records and administer other users. The right response depends on the organization’s size, risk and available controls; do not assume a generic role matrix fits every employer.
For a small team, a compensating review might be performed by another authorized person using change logs and final outputs. State exactly what that reviewer sees and when. “Leadership oversight” is too vague to demonstrate that an unusual action would be noticed.
Make temporary access actually temporary
Implementation consultants, internal substitutes and special-project staff may need time-limited permissions. Record an intended end date, owner and removal check. An expired project assignment does not necessarily remove system access automatically.
Review movers as well as leavers. A person who transfers from payroll to another function may retain an old role unless someone explicitly revisits it. Compare current duties with current permissions and obtain a decision for each mismatch.
Protect authentication and recovery
CISA’s MFA guidance supports stronger authentication, especially for administrative access. Confirm the available options, enrollment ownership and recovery route with the system owner. A recovery process that bypasses the intended approval controls can undermine the protection of the normal sign-in process.
Never solve a coverage gap by sharing a password. Assign approved backup access and verify that the backup can perform the required work. Keep emergency access governed, monitored and reviewed after use under the organization’s security process.
Close with evidence of the change
The review output should distinguish retain, change, remove and unresolved. For changes, record who authorized the action and evidence that it took effect. A request ticket marked submitted is not proof of removal. Recheck the resulting permission state through an authorized method.
The FTC small-business cybersecurity material recommends limiting vendor access to the information and time needed. Apply the same question to a provider connection: what access is necessary now, and what should end when the service or project ends?
Keep the review summary appropriately restricted and omit credentials. Feed unresolved high-consequence access into the security evidence review; include removal and export ownership in the exit plan. The point is a capability state that matches approved work, not a signed spreadsheet that nobody verified.